Historically, philosophers have tended to see moral responsibility as a matter of having a certain metaphysical status. Strawson shifted the debate by defining responsibility as part of an interpersonal practice, but he did not discuss the relationship between interpersonal relationships and the politics of oppression. His view, in other words, was an example of ideal theory. This article adopts a non‐ideal theoretic framework to explore how ordinary responsibility practices uphold intersecting logics of oppression. It argues that the reactive attitudes function (...) to police double binds, creating situations of oppression for marginalized groups. (shrink)

In the past decade the central principles of western feminist theory have been dramatically challenged. many feminists have endorsed post-structuralism's rejection of essentialist theoretical categories, and have added a powerful gender dimension to contemporary critiques of modernity. Earlier 'women' have been radically undermined, and newer concerns with 'difference', 'identity', and 'power' have emerged. Destabilizing Theory explores these developments in a set of specially commissioned essays by feminist theorists. Does this change amount to a real shift within feminist theory, or will (...) feminism's links with an emancipatory modernism reinstate an older political agenda? Can we transcend the common counterposition of equality and difference, or is feminism condemned to argue within the terms of this binary opposition? (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Newton" verfügbar.

Fondé sur la nécessité du discernement et des libertés créatrices, l'humanisme de G. Fessard en appelle à l'universel, fruit d'une recherche humaine et sociétale en perpétuelle recréation, et d'une attention constante portée aux situations et aux évènements.

This paper takes part in the ongoing debate on how emotions can be dealt with by argumentation theory. Its main goal is to formulate a relationship between emotion and argumentation which differs from that usually found in most of the literature on the subject. In the “standard” conception, emotions are seen as the objects of appeals which function as adjuvants to argumentation: speakers appeal to pity, fear, shame and the like in order to enhance the cogency of an argument which (...) bears on something else—whether it be the validity of a disputable opinion or the opportunity of a course of action. According to the “alternative” conception which I propose to consider, emotions themselves may be viewed, in some cases, as the very objects of argumentation. This conception lays emphasis on the arguability of emotions. Drawing on insights from current psychological and philosophical theories, it involves a reassessment of the Aristotelian concept of pathos, as well as an in-depth critical discussion of normative and descriptive approaches to emotional appeals. (shrink)

If we consider the field of argumentation studies, we notice that many approaches consider argumentation in a pragmatic manner and define it as a verbal activity oriented towards the realization of a goal . The idea that subtends—in an explicit or implicit way—most of these approaches is that argumentation fundamentally aims to produce an effect upon an addressee, and that this effect consists in a change of attitude with respect to a viewpoint : argumentation theories inevitably confront the issue of (...) persuasion. In this article, I defend, on the contrary, the hypothesis that it is not necessary to have recourse to the notion of persuasion, nor even to speak of an attempt to provoke a change of attitude in the addressee , in order to develop a general definition of argumentation. It seems to me that there are serious reasons to uncouple, insofar as a definition is concerned, argumentation and persuasion. I will look to identify these reasons, to formulate them and to evaluate their strength. In the same vein as recent works by Christian Plantin and Marc Angenot, I will try to contribute to the development of a non - persuasive conception of argumentation. Such a conception bases the definition of argumentation on the pragmatic aims of “justification” and “positioning”, as well as on the articulation of a discourse and a counter-discourse. I argue that such a conception might offer a better empirical adequacy than those that link, insofar as a definition, the argumentative activity and the persuasive aim. (shrink)

Quiconque considère la résurgence du cynisme à la Renaissance pénètre un domaine vaste, mais laissé en friche par les philosophes et délaissé des littéraires. Quelques exemples suffisent à en évaluer l'étendue : reconnaître Diogène dans le Christ et faire - subrepticement - du premier des Adages un adage diogénique ; s'assimiler à Diogène roulant son tonneau pour illustrer la fabrique du Tiers Livre ; attaquer saint Augustin pour son incapacité à comprendre l'impudeur des cyniques ; souhaiter comme idéal pour l'homme (...) de n'être "serf de personne". Voilà quatre positions où l'on aura reconnu Erasme, Rabelais, Montaigne ainsi que La Boétie et qui attestent que, si le cynisme est bien une philosophie de la Renaissance, il a aussi été un formidable moyen de penser et de parler à neuf. Alors que le bien-dire envahit l'espace public, le dire vrai des cyniques, incisif, est apte à façonner des formes littéraires inédites et à procurer de nouveaux moyens critiques. Contre ceux qui pensent conforter la morale avec des discours bien-pensants, Diogène n'affirmait-il pas, crânement, que l'exercice de la vertu n'est pas pour les pisse-froid, qu'on peut être obscène et vertueux, violent et pédagogue, tout en restant "joyeux entre mille"? (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Claude Tresmontant est un formidable appel à un développement théologique digne des défis actuels du XXIe siècle, fondé sur les bases solides théologiques reconnues par l'Eglise, en particulier les conciles. Tresmontant qui connaît parfaitement l'hébreu s'est livré à une recherche approfondie sur le véritable contenu du christianisme. Sa pensée est celle d'une métaphysique qui nous réconcilie avec le réel : il donne toute sa place dans la réflexion à ce que les sciences de la nature nous enseignent.